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The containment of epidemic spreading is a major challenge in science. Vaccination, whenever available, is
the best way to prevent the spreading, because it eventually immunizes individuals. However, vaccines are not
perfect, and total immunization is not guaranteed. Imperfect immunization has driven the emergence of antivaccine
movements that totally alter the predictions about the epidemic incidence. Here, we propose a mathematically
solvable mean-field vaccination model to mimic the spontaneous adoption of vaccines against influenzalike
diseases and the expected epidemic incidence. The results are in agreement with extensive Monte Carlo simulations
of the epidemics and vaccination coevolutionary processes. Interestingly, the results reveal a nonmonotonic
behavior on the vaccination coverage that increases with the imperfection of the vaccine and after decreases.
This apparent counterintuitive behavior is analyzed and understood from stability principles of the proposed
mathematical model.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.97.032308
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantitative study of disease propagation has captured
the attention of statistical physicists for a long time [1–3].
Specifically, this approach has shed light on many conundrums
by considering the networked structure of contacts, their time-
varying and multilayer character, as well as the recurrent nature
of mobility patterns [4–8]. Vaccination, whenever possible, is
the most effective way to harness and prevent the spreading
of a disease [9]. Under normal circumstances, the decision
of getting vaccinated can be considered as an act of coop-
eration, since it bestows benefits on the whole population at
the expenses of single individuals. Notwithstanding, we are
recently witnessing the emergence of widespread antivaccine
movements, which are mainly fueled by misconceptions and
mischievous news about vaccines [10–16]. Scientists (includ-
ing physicists) are devoting tremendous efforts in designing
efficient immunization strategies [17] as well as shedding light
on the mechanisms behind the deliberate decision of not getting
vaccinated and their harmful consequences [18,19].
Vaccination can be modeled as a strategy of a game. Under
such premises, the evolution of vaccines’ voluntary adoption
can be investigated using the machinery of game theory [20,21]
and statistical physics [22,23]. The first studies carried out on
vaccination games use classical game theory, with single round
games in which agents have perfect knowledge of their odds
to get infected [24,25]. In reality, however, individuals are not
perfectly aware of the risk to get infected, and vaccination
coverage may evolve in time as a byproduct of personal
experiences or imitation. Therefore, evolutionary game theory
is the natural workbench to tackle the problem. The seminal
works in this direction assumed the simultaneous evolution
of vaccination and spreading dynamics [26–28]. A different
approach was used in the case of seasonal influenza, by
considering that the spreading process reaches its stationary
state before vaccination games take place [29–32].
Here, we introduce a mean-field framework to mimic the
spontaneous adoption of vaccines against influenza-like dis-
eases. Our model captures the essence of previous approaches
to gauge, analytically, the risk of epidemic outbreaks. In
particular, we use a minimal evolutionary vaccination game to
infer the strategies adopted before an epidemic season. This,
in turns, allows us to estimate the risk of future outbreaks
by encapsulating agents’ strategies into an epidemic model.
We get analytical results and insightful conclusions from the
analysis of this framework in well-mixed populations. More
specifically, we unveil how the interplay between the proba-
bility of infection, vaccine effectiveness, and cost, gives rise
to nonlinear responses in vaccine uptake. Our analysis reveals
a nonmonotonic behavior on the vaccination coverage which,
surprisingly, increases as the vaccine quality deteriorates. Such
counterintuitive behavior is analyzed and understood from
stability principles of the proposed mathematical model.
II. THE MODEL
Let us consider a well-mixed population of N agents or indi-
viduals. We assume that this population has initially undergone
a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) disease spreading [2,3].
To stay simple and keep the problem still analytically solvable,
we set the disease incidence in such previous season equal to α.
Such quantity is an input parameter of the model and acts as a
proxy for the perception of infection risk, e.g., advised through
the mass-media. After the first outbreak, the vaccination
dynamics takes place. As a result, agents converge to the
decision of vaccinating (V) or not (NV). The resulting strategy
is the outcome of the evolutionary dynamics (see below) given
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the previous incidence, α, infection probability, β, recovery
cost, T , the cost of the vaccine, c, and its failure rate, γ ,
or equivalently, its effectiveness (1 − γ ). The corresponding
vaccine coverage—given by the fraction of vaccinated agents
yeq—is used as the input of a new SIR spreading process,
having the sameβ andT . The results of the SIR dynamics allow
us to estimate the total infection incidence, R∞, as a function
of the relevant parameters, especially α. The mathematical
definition of α is the probability of infection, in the previous
outbreak, of an agent without protection against the disease.
Vaccination dynamics consists of a repeatedly played two
strategy game, in which agents either take the vaccine (s = V)
or not (s = NV). Agents will decide according to: (i) the cost
associated to uptaking the vaccine (c) and (ii) the recovery
cost (T ) weighted by the perceived risk of getting infected
by a contact in a future outbreak. The latter risk depends on
the previous incidence α, the infection rate β, and the vaccine
effectivenesss (1 − γ ). It is worth stressing that the vaccination
cost should not be seen purely as a financial one. It also
includes, for example, vaccine hesitancy [11,12]. The payoffs
associated to each of the four possible encounters between
pairs of agents are:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
PV→ V = −c − γ 2βαT
PV→ NV = −c − γβαT
PNV→ V = −γβαT
PNV→ NV = −βαT
, (1)
where Ps1→s2 is the payoff accumulated by an agent with
strategy s1 when it meets another having strategy s2 (s1,s2 ∈
{V,NV }). As explained above, the prefactors of the recovery
cost (T ) in Eq. (1) are modulated by the perceived risk of
infection given the previous outbreak, encapsulated in α, and
the probability that an individual playing with strategy s1 is
infected by another with strategy s2.
The fitness of an agent i, πi , is defined as the sum of payoffs
accumulated across its pairwise interactions. Every agent i
with strategy si chooses randomly another one j , with strategy
sj , compares their fitness (πi, πj ) and if πj > πi adopts j ’s
strategy with probability:
sj→si =
πj − πi
max
∀sa,sb,sc,sd∈{V,NV }
(Psa→sb − Psc→sd )
. (2)
The strategies of the agents are updated synchronously after
each round of the game. Using the above update function,
and assuming that agents are well-mixed, the mean outcome
of the individual decisions follows the so-called replicator
equation [20]:
y˙ = y (〈πV 〉 − 〈π〉), (3)
where y is the fraction of vaccinated agents, 〈πV 〉 the average
payoff of a vaccinated agent, and 〈π〉 the average payoff of the
population. According to the payoffs in Eq. (1), the replicator
equation reads
y˙ = −y(1 − y){c − βαT (1 − γ )[1 − (1 − γ )y]}. (4)
The above equation admits two trivial equilibrium points
(yeq = 0 and yeq = 1), and a third, nontrivial, one:
y∗ = 1
1 − γ
[
1 − c
βT α(1 − γ )
]
. (5)
The criteria for the existence of the nontrivial equilibrium
point have an intuitive interpretation. In fact, the condition
y∗ > 0 is equivalent to PNV→ NV < PV→ NV, which translates
into a vaccination threshold ˜β = c/αT (1 − γ ). In other words,
it is impossible to observe vaccination in a system where
c > T , i.e., where vaccinating costs more than recovery. The
criterion y∗ < 1 translates into PV→ V < PNV→ V, correspond-
ing to β < ˜β/γ . If this condition is not fulfilled, a vaccinated
agent has a higher payoff than a nonvaccinated one regardless
of the opponents strategies, hence leading to full vaccination.
In the next section, we analyze the stability of the equilibrium
points.
A. Stability analysis of the model
The evolution ofy is ruled by Eq. (4). To analyze the stability
of its fixed points, we need to evaluate the derivatives of the
selection gradient, F (y), corresponding to the right-hand side
of Eq. (4):
dF (y)
dy
= −(1 − 2y){c − βαT (1 − γ )[1 − (1 − γ )y]}
− y(1 − y)βαT (1 − γ )2. (6)
Evaluating the derivative at the internal fixed point, y∗, we get
dF (y)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=y∗
= −y∗(1 − y∗)βαT (1 − γ )2. (7)
If the internal fixed point lies in (0 < y∗ < 1), then it is stable,
since dF (y)
dy
|
y=y∗ < 0. Otherwise, if (y
∗ < 0) or (y∗ > 1), then
the fixed point y∗ is unstable. Evaluating the derivative at the
monomorphic states (yeq = 0 and yeq = 1), we get
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
dF (y)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=0
= βαT (1 − γ ) − c = PV → NV − PNV → NV
dF (y)
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=1
= c − βαT (1 − γ )γ = PNV → V − PV → V
.
(8)
Consequently, the derivative evaluated at the monomorphic
states corresponds to the existence criteria y∗ > 0 and y∗ < 1,
respectively. Therefore, the monomorphic states are unstable in
the presence of the internal fixed point, y∗, and reach stability
depending on whether y∗ < 0 or y∗ > 1. These findings are
summarized in Fig. 1, which presents the selection gradient as
a function of the vaccination coverage, y, in the presence of
the internal fixed point, y∗. One can see that y∗ is stable and
as the internal fixed point is shifted to y∗ = 0 or y∗ = 1, the
corresponding monomorphic state reaches stability.
Therefore, the vaccination coverage, yeq, being defined by
the stable equilibrium point, is given by the internal fixed point
yeq = y∗ for ˜β  β  ˜β/γ , whereas for β < ˜β and ˜β/γ < β
it is given by yeq = 0 and yeq = 1, respectively.
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FIG. 1. Selection gradient, y˙ = F (y), as a function of the
vaccination coverage, y. The parameters are set to c = 0.1, α = 0.3,
β = 0.55, γ = 0.1, and T = 1.0.
B. Interpretation of results
According to Eq. (5), high values of c are detrimental for
vaccination, while high values of T and β boosts it. Addition-
ally, the vaccination coverage depends exclusively on the ratio
between vaccination and recovery costs, which we denote as
f = c/T . Therefore, considering Eq. (5), one can see that full
vaccination cannot be stable for a perfect vaccine unlessf = 0.
More subtle is the dependence on the vaccination quality γ .
In fact, lowering vaccine quality increases vaccine coverage
(dy∗/dγ > 0) if the fraction of effectively vaccinated agents
yeff > 0.5, where yeff = (1 − γ )y. Noteworthy, albeit the
quality of the vaccine worsens, agents will choose more often
to vaccinate.
At first glance, the increase in vaccine uptake as its ef-
fectiveness decrease may seem counterintuitive. The rationale
behind this is as follows: as γ increases there is a competition
between the increasing risk of getting infected and the reduced
protection bestowed by the vaccine itself, as shown in Fig. 2.
To shed light on such competition, one may look at the
decrease of the vaccine’s effectiveness 1 − γ as a dynamical
process. As effectiveness decreases, the risk for a not vac-
cinated agent of getting infected by a previously vaccinated
one becomes yeff × βαγ . Conversely, the risk of a vaccinated
agent to get infected by a nonvaccinated becomes (1 − yeff) ×
βαγ . Comparing these two risks, the vaccinated agent has an
advantage over the nonvaccinated if yeff > (1 − yeff), which
translates into yeff > 0.5. Hence, the counterintuitive act of
vaccinating when the efficiency of the vaccine is low turns
out to be a rational decision to mitigate the infection pressure.
Moreover, the existence—for each infectivity β—of a maxi-
mum fraction of vaccinated agents, y∗max, delimitates a region
of “tolerable effectiveness” beyond which agents decide to non
vaccinate. Also, the position of y∗max versus β splits the phase
space into two distinct regions (Fig. 2 inset). Interestingly, this
effect has been observed previously in other coevolutionary
models [31–33], but never explained hitherto. At variance
with y, the fraction of effectively vaccinated agents, yeff, is
always lowered by a decrease of the vaccine quality, i.e.,
d[(1−γ )y∗]
dγ
< 0. Therefore, the higher vaccination coverage is
not counterbalancing the lower vaccine quality. Let us analyze
this dependency more in detail.
C. Dependence of the vaccination uptake on vaccine quality
There are three different regimes regarding the dependency
of the vaccination coverage, yeq, on γ . The first one is the
FIG. 2. Vaccination coverage at equilibrium, y∗, as a function
of effectiveness, 1 − γ for two different values of the infection
probability β. The dashed line indicates the fraction of effectively
vaccinated agents. The other parameters are α = 0.4, c = 0.1, and
T = 1.0. The maximum coverage y∗max is denoted by a point, and the
dotted line delimits the tolerance range. The inset displays the value
of the maximum coverage y∗max given in Eq. (10) as a function of
infectivity β. The color highlights the region where vaccination takes
place or not.
absence of vaccination independently of γ , corresponding
to β < c
αT
= f
α
. In the second regime y∗(γ = 0) < 0.5 the
vaccination coverage is monotonously decreasing with γ .
Therefore, maximal vaccination coverage is reached for a
perfect vaccine γ = 0. The condition y∗(γ = 0) < 0.5 is
equivalent to β  2f
α
. In the third regime β > 2f
α
, the depen-
dence ofy∗ onγ is non monotonous, wherefore the vaccination
coverage is maximal for a non perfect vaccine. The vaccine
quality maximizing the vaccination coverage is then found
from dy∗/dγ = 0, giving
γc = 1 − 2f
βα
. (9)
The vaccine quality maximizing the vaccination coverage
can also be seen as a tolerance threshold. If 1 − γ becomes
worse than 1 − γc, agents start refusing taking the vaccine
and the vaccination coverage drops rapidly, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. From there, the maximal vaccination coverage in the
three regimes is then given by⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
y∗max = 0 if β  fα
y∗max = 1 − fβα if fα < β  2fα
y∗max = βα4f if 2fα  β .
(10)
The maximal vaccination coverage, y∗max, as a function of
β is presented, instead, in the inset of Fig. 3.
III. IMPACT OF VACCINATION
ON THE EPIDEMIC SPREADING
After discussing the outcome of the vaccination dynamics,
we now turn our focus towards its impact on the subsequent
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(a)
(b)
(c)
FIG. 3. Vaccination coverage, yeq (a), and fraction of recovered individuals, R∞ (b), as a function of disease incidence in the previous season,
α, and infection probability, β. The red solid line corresponds to the vaccination threshold, ˜β, separating the region where no vaccine uptake
occurs from the one where nonzero vaccination could be observed. In panel (b), the white solid lines correspond to the epidemic thresholds in the
absence of (β = 0.2), and in presence (α = 0.5) of vaccination according to Eq. (13). The other variables are fixed to c = 0.1, T = 1.0, γ = 0.1
and μ = 0.2. (c) R∞ as a function of β for different costs of the vaccine, c. The inset presents the vaccination coverage, yeq. Additionally, the
critical values of β are presented following Eq. (15) such as the purely epidemic threshold, βc, the vaccination threshold, ˜β, and the threshold
for full vaccination, ˜β/γ . The remaining variables are fixed to T = 1.0, γ = 0.4, α = 0.4, and μ = 0.1.
epidemic outbreak. Assuming that the vaccination dynamics
always ends up in the unique stable equilibrium point, yeq; we
can use such information to compute the extent of a future
epidemic outbreak by using a SIR compartmental model [3].
The dynamics of the SIR model is then given by⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
˙S = −βIS
˙I = βIS − μI
˙R= μI
, (11)
where S, I , and R denote the fraction of susceptible, infected,
and recovered agents, respectively. The aforementioned quan-
tities fulfill the conservation law S + I + R + (1 − γ )yeq = 1.
Note that μ = 1/T indicates the recovery probability in agree-
ment with the vaccination game. The fraction of recovered
agents after the epidemics dies out, R∞, is given by the
following trascendental equation:
R∞ = 1 − (1 − γ )yeq − [1 − (1 − γ )yeq − I0] e−
β
μ
R∞ ,
(12)
where I0 is the initial fraction of infected agents. Equation (12)
has no analytical solution, hence it must be solved numerically.
Nevertheless, in an infinite size system (N → ∞), the term I0
can be neglected since I0 	 1. Thus, a nonnegligible fraction
of recovered agents, R∞, exists if
β >
μ
1 − (1 − γ )yeq = βc, (13)
where βc denotes the epidemic threshold. As expected, if the
system displays no vaccination, yeq = 0, and the above criteria
reduces to the purely epidemic SIR threshold βc = μ. Instead,
for the full vaccination case, yeq = 1, the criteria becomes
βc = μ/γ . Finally, for the internal fixed point, yeq = y∗, the
existence of R∞ > 0 in Eq. (12) implies
f
μα(1 − γ ) > 1. (14)
Surprisingly, this condition is independent of β. Therefore,
the increased vaccination coverage balances the increased
transmission probability in the subsequent epidemic outbreak.
In Fig. 3, we display the vaccination coverage, yeq (panel
a), and the fraction of recovered agents, R∞ (panel b), as a
function of the previous season incidenceα, and the probability
of infection β in the case of a perfect vaccine (γ = 0). As
expected, a remarkably high fraction of recovered agents is
observed for a highly infective epidemic (large β) paired with a
small fraction of infected agents in the previous outbreak (small
α). In Fig. 3(b), one can observe that, given a value of α, the
fraction of recovered individuals is maximal at the vaccination
threshold ˜β. A way of finding the maxima and minima of the
fraction of recovered agents, R∞, is considering its derivative
with respect to the tranmission probability, β, d R∞
dβ
. Note that
in an infinite system, the transcendental equation Eq. (12) takes
three different forms depending on the vaccination coverage:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
R∞ = 1 − e−
β
μ
R∞ if μ < β  ˜β
R∞ = ˜ββ
(
1 − e− βμ R∞) if ˜β < β  ˜β
γ
R∞ = γ
(
1 − e− βμ R∞) if ˜β
γ
< β  1
. (15)
To find an explicit expression for d R∞
dβ
, we derive both sides
of Eq. (15) and subsequently rearrange terms, which leads to
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dR∞
dβ
= R∞
μ
(
e
β
μ R∞− β
μ
) , if μ < β  ˜β
dR∞
dβ
= R∞+
μ
β
(
1−e βμ R∞
)
μβ
˜β
(
e
β
μ R∞− ˜β
μ
) , if ˜β < β  ˜β
γ
dR∞
dβ
= R∞γ
μ
(
e
β
μ R∞−γ β
μ
) , if ˜β
γ
< β  1 .
(16)
To infer information about the sign of d R∞
dβ
we need to bound
R∞. By using again Eq. (15) and the inequality 1−e−x > x1+x ,
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we find a lower bound for R∞ as⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
R∞ > 1 − μβ , if μ < β  ˜β
R∞ >
˜β
β
− μ
β
, if ˜β < β  ˜β
γ
R∞ > γ − μβ , if
˜β
γ
< β  1.
(17)
These lower bounds can then be combined with the in-
equality e
λ
μ
R∞  1 + λ
μ
R∞. The strict inequality holds for all
R∞ > 0. This enables us to develop the expressions for the
derivative in Eq. (16), leading to
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
dR∞
dβ
> 0 , if μ < β  ˜β
dR∞
dβ
< 0 , if ˜β < β  ˜β
γ
dR∞
dβ
> 0 , if ˜β
γ
< β  1.
(18)
The cases β < ˜β and ˜β
γ
< β are as expected. In these
regimes the vaccination coverage does not vary with β
(yeq = 0 and yeq = 1, respectively), wherefore R∞ increases
monotonously with β. In the intermediate regime ˜β < β <
˜β/γ , though, where yeq = y∗, R∞ monotonously decreases
with β ( dR∞
dβ
< 0). Consequently, vaccination emerges in a way
such that it outweighs the increased transmission probability
and hinders the epidemic spreading, as illustrated in Fig. 3(c).
From these considerations, we can conclude that the fraction of
recovered agents is locally maximal at β = ˜β, and locally min-
imal at β = ˜β/γ . The numerical exploration of the parameter
space has confirmed hitherto that the former is also a global
maximum. Moreover, the highest fraction of recovered, Rmax∞ ,
for a fully vaccinated population (yeq = 1) would correspond
to meaningless values of the parameters. Depending on the
parameters, the system will not be in all of the three regimes
presented in Eq. (18) as the transmission probability, β, is
varied. If the parameters are such that ˜β/γ > 1, the system will
never fall in the third regime. Consequently, R∞ monotonously
decreases once vaccination emerges. Similarly, one might
have ˜β > 1 for which the system shows no vaccination and
R∞ monotonously increases with β. The different cases are
illustrated in Fig. 3(c).
Numerical simulations
To validate that the previous equations are actually de-
scribing the behavior of the considered system, we have
compared the analytical results discussed above with those
obtained via Monte Carlo simulations. The simulations have
been made for a system of N = 1000 agents updating their
strategy accordingly to Eq. (2), and averaged over Nreal = 50
realizations. The difference between theory and the simulation
for the vaccine coverage, y, and fraction of infected agents,
R∞, is plotted in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b). The maximal differences
for y and R∞ are around 0.2% and 2.5%, respectively. The
average relative errors, instead, are 0.2% for y and 2.0%
for R∞.
The agreement between analytical and numerical simula-
tions, σ , is thus ∼2%.
We want to remark also that preliminary analysis made
in the case of discrete interactions encoded as networks
showed similar results, although we lack an analytical solution.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 4. Differences between the quantities computed using
Monte Carlo simulations and their analytical counterparts as a
function of parameters α and β. Panel (a) presents the case of yeq,
while panel (b) the case of R∞, instead. The other parameters are set
to N = 1000, γ = 0.1, μ = 0.2, and T = 1.0, respectively.
Notwithstanding, the well-mixed population proves to be a
good approximation for the vaccination dynamics on networks.
This is very likely due to the vaccination cost term in the
total payoff, which does not scale with the degree of nodes.
Additionally, the nontrivial increase in vaccine uptake—as
effectiveness decreases—is also observed in simulations on
networked populations [31].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Summing up, we have presented a mean-field model to
predict vaccine uptake for influenzalike diseases using the
disease incidence during previous outbreak season as a proxy
for the “perception of infection risk.” The model predicts the
existence of a tolerance range of vaccine effectiveness, where
a nontrivial increase in vaccination coverage takes place as the
vaccine inefficiency increases. Albeit appearing irrational and
counterintuitive at first sight, such behavior is—instead—due
to the interplay between the vaccination game and the disease
spreading processes. The model predicts also that highly
infective—but under control—epidemics might prove danger-
ous for future infections, since they alter the “risk perception”
of the agents and induce them to nonvaccination. Finally, as
mentioned in the introduction, the timescale between the two
dynamics (decision and spreading) has always been considered
fixed. The sole exception, up to our knowledge, are childhood
diseases with long term immunity [27,34]. The framework
presented here could be used to fill the gap among different
model formulations and unify them.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
P.D.L.R. acknowledges the financial support of Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation under Grant No. CRSII2_147609.
A.C. acknowledges the financial support of MINECO through
Grant No. RYC-2012-01043. J.G.G. acknowledges financial
support from MINECO (Projects No. FIS2015-71582-C2 and
No. 377 FIS2014-55867-P) and from the Departamento de
Industria e Innovación del Gobierno de Aragón y Fondo Social
Europeo (FENOL group E-19). A.A. acknowledges financial
support from Spanish MINECO (Grant No. FIS2015-71582-
C2-1), Generalitat de Catalunya ICREA Academia, and the
James S. McDonnell Foundation under Grant No. 220020325.
032308-5
BENJAMIN STEINEGGER et al. PHYSICAL REVIEW E 97, 032308 (2018)
[1] R. Pastor-Satorras, C. Castellano, P. Van Mieghem, and A.
Vespignani, Epidemic processes in complex networks, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 87, 925 (2015).
[2] R. M. Anderson and R. M. May, Population biology of infectious
diseases: Part I, Nature 280, 361 (1979).
[3] R. M. Anderson and R. M. May, Infectious Diseases of Humans
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992).
[4] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, Epidemic Spread-
ing in Scale-Free Networks, Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3200
(2001).
[5] A. Vazquez, B. Rácz, A. Lukács, and A.-L. Barabási, Impact of
Non-Poissonian Activity Patterns on Spreading Processes, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 98, 158702 (2007).
[6] M. De Domenico, C. Granell, M. A. Porter, and A. Arenas,
The physics of spreading processes in multilayer networks, Nat.
Phys. 12, 901 (2016).
[7] P. Holme, Three faces of node importance in network epidemi-
ology: Exact results for small graphs, Phys. Rev. E 96, 062305
(2017).
[8] J. Gómez-Gardeñes, D. Soriano-Paños, and A. Arenas,
Critical regimes driven by recurrent mobility patterns of
reaction-diffusion processes in networks, Nat. Phys. (2018),
doi:10.1038/s41567-017-0022-7.
[9] M. Wadman and J. You, The vaccine wars, Science 356, 364
(2017).
[10] On the wrong side of history, Nature Microbiol. 2, 17046
(2017).
[11] P. Schmid, D. Rauber, C. Betsch, G. Lidolt, and M.-L. Denker,
Barriers of influenza vaccination intention and behavior—A
systematic review of influenza vaccine hesitancy, 2005–2016,
PLoS ONE 12, e0170550 (2017).
[12] H. J. Larson, C. Jarrett, E. Eckersberger, D. M. D. Smith, and P.
Paterson, Understanding vaccine hesitancy around vaccines and
vaccination from a global perspective: A systematic review of
published literature, 2007–2012, Vaccine 32, 2150 (2014).
[13] A. Wakefield et al., RETRACTED: Ileal-lymphoid-nodular
hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental
disorder in children, Lancet 351, 637 (1998).
[14] D. A. Salmon, L. H. Moulton, S. B. Omer, M. P. deHart,
S. Stokley, and N. A. Halsey, Factors associated with refusal
of childhood vaccines among parents of school-aged children:
A case-control study, Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 159, 470
(2005).
[15] E. K. Brunson, The impact of social networks on parents’
vaccination decisions, Pediatrics 131, e1397 (2013).
[16] G. L. Freed, S. J. Clark, A. T. Butchart, D. C. Singer, and M.
M. Davis, Sources and perceived credibility of vaccine-safety
information for parents, Pediatrics 127, S107 (2011).
[17] Z. Wang et al., Statistical physics of vaccination, Phys. Rep. 664,
1 (2016).
[18] C. Betsch, Advocating for vaccination in a climate of science
denial, Nature Microbiol. 2, 17106 (2017).
[19] C. Betsch, R. Böhm, L. Korn, and C. Holtmann, On the benefits
of explaining herd immunity in vaccine advocacy, Nature Hum.
Behav. 1, 56 (2017).
[20] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics—Exploring the Equa-
tions of Life (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2006).
[21] H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving, 2nd ed. (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009).
[22] C. Hauert and G. Szabó, Game theory and physics, Am. J. Phys.
73, 405 (2005)
[23] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, Coevolutionary games—A mini
review, Biosystems 99, 109 (2010)
[24] C. T. Bauch, A. P. Galvani, and D. J. D. Earn, Group interest
versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy, Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 100, 10564 (2003).
[25] C. T. Bauch and D. J. D. Earn, Vaccination and the theory of
games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 101, 13391 (2004).
[26] S. Bhattacharyya and C. T. Bauch, A game dynamic model for
delayer strategies in vaccinating behavior for pediatric infectious
diseases, J. Theor. Biol. 267, 276 (2010).
[27] C. T. Bauch and S. Bhattacharyya, Evolutionary game theory
and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold,
PLoS Comput. Biol. 8, e1002452 (2012).
[28] A. d’Onofrio, P. Manfredi, and P. Poletti, The interplay of public
intervention and private choices in determining the outcome of
vaccination programmes, PLoS ONE 7, e45653 (2012).
[29] F. Fu, R. I. Rosenbloom, L. Wang, and M. A. Nowak, Imitation
dynamics of vaccination behavior on social networks, Proc. R.
Soc. B: Biol. Sci. 278, 42 (2011).
[30] H. Zhang, F. Fu, W. Zhang, and B. Wang, Rational behavior is a
“double-edged sword” when considering voluntary vaccination,
Physica A: Stat. Mech. Appl. 391, 4807 (2012).
[31] A. Cardillo, C. Reyes-Suárez, F. Naranjo, and J. Gómez-
Gardeñes, Evolutionary vaccination dilemma in complex net-
works, Phys. Rev. E 88, 032803 (2013).
[32] B. Wu, F. Fu, and L. Wang, Imperfect vaccine aggravates the
long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccination, PLoS ONE 6,
e20577 (2011).
[33] L. G. Alvarez-Zuzek, C. E. La Rocca, J. R. Iglesias, and
L. A. Braunstein, Epidemic spreading in multiplex networks
influenced by opinion exchanges on vaccination, PLoS ONE
12, e0186492 (2017).
[34] C. T. Bauch, Imitation dynamics predict vaccinating behavior,
Proc. R. Soc. B 272, 1669 (2005).
032308-6
